<In this revised version of the theory, certain notations have been adjusted to improve the conceptual coherence of the model. The notion initially presented as the 'power of nsciousness acquisition' is now defined as the 'vector of consciousness acquisition', while the notion previously designated as the 'energy of consciousness acquisition' is redefined as the 'power of consciousness acquisition'. Moreover, a "new concept" is introduced: the psychophysical energy of consciousness acquisition, defined as a temporal energy E, which then corresponds to the accumulation of instantaneous perceptual effects over multiple cycles of priority integration. These terminological adjustments allow the concepts of power and energy in the model to be aligned with their actual definitions in physics, thereby ensuring a more rigorous conceptual coherence. - In this work we have tried to understand the mechanisms of consciousness by means of a certain symbolic representation. It is from this that we arrive at the establishment of mathematical formulae on the dynamic psychophysical mechanisms of consciousness, which can allow an explanation and a mechanistic description of the basic phenomena linked to it, and leading specifically to the concept of the fundamental state of consciousness. Within this framework, consciousness appears as a dynamic consequence of attention when integration crosses a critical threshold governed by a fundamental constant—the golden ratio φ—interpreted here as an attentional constant. The theory thus established is based on concepts developed through mathematical reasoning and a psycho-cognitive approach. It is therefore a reflective theory, none of whose concepts derive from neuroscientific work on the subject. Consequently, it is not particularly necessary to have prior knowledge of neuroscience or any other cognitive science in order to approach it. Isn't it important to have a theory that goes beyond the strict framework of neuroscience in order to unify the various fields of study linked to consciousness, including philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence and neuroscience itself? In other words, shouldn't the starting point be abstract concepts, where empirical data can serve as evidence? By situating itself upstream of neurobiological descriptions, this theory proposes a unifying abstract framework in which empirical data can serve as elements of validation rather than as the point of departure. Ultimately, it is more of an explanatory tool of consciousness, making it possible to devise a mechanistic basis for understanding human consciousness, and perhaps any other form of consciousness.