This article discusses some of the problems inherent in US and European SPACs (special purpose acquisition companies) which motivated the author's creation of proprietary SPAC structures and incentives. The main findings are that: i) traditional US and European SPACs are very inefficient and costly, and can increase market volatility and Financial Instability; ii) SPACs are being mis-used by investors that seek short-term returns (via stockredemptions at De-SPAC which have become more of an investment strategy with new ETFs launched, rather than a corporate governance mechanism) and companies that seek to list their shares on exchanges; iii) the author's SPACs can solve most of the problems caused by traditional SPACs; iv) many alternatives (to SPACs) that have been recommended by researchers and practitioners focus on how to list shares of single companies on financial exchanges (sponsored IPOs and direct-listings), whereas there is substantial worldwide need for “statutory” entities that can be used for ESG/UN-SDG Finance and efficient Industry Rollups of private/non-listed companies and SMEs (for whom IPOs and direct-listings are not suitable or are too costly, and for whom listing provides significant benefits); v) most researchers have excessively focused on SPACs’ returns which don’t tell the whole story, while omitting the legal/structural and Financial Stability risks of SPACs. The author estimates that for the average US or European SPAC, each of the author's models can save at least $1.20 million in costs during the first three years.